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The Feeling of Agency Hypothesis: A Critique 
By Thor Grünbaum (Philosophy, University of Copenhagen) 
 
Abstract 
A dominant view in contemporary cognitive neuroscience is that low-level, comparator-based 
mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive experience often called the feeling of 
agency (the FoA-hypothesis). An opposing view is that comparator-based motor control is 
largely non-conscious and not associated with any particular type of distinctive 
phenomenology (the simple hypothesis). In this paper, I critically evaluate the nature of the 
empirical evidence researchers commonly take to support FoA-hypothesis. The aim of this 
paper is not only to scrutinize the FoA-hypothesis and data supposed to support it; it is 
equally to argue that experimentalists supporting the FoA-hypothesis fail to establish that the 




A number of prominent cognitive neuroscientists and philosophers have argued that a 
distinctive feeling of agency plays an important role in individual motor cognition. For 
instance, Haggard and Chambon (2012) write in a recent paper: “Most of us have the feeling 
that we are in control of what we are doing most of the time: this is the normal sense of 
agency” (R390). In a discussion of possible computational mechanisms producing the feeling 
of agency, they add, “The prospective aspect of agency gives a clue as to why the brain might 
provide a distinctive conscious experience of being in control” (R392, my emphasis).1 And 
Bayne and Pacherie (2007) write: “agentive experience – that is, our moment-by-moment 
                                                          
1
 For similar statements, see Chambon and Haggard, 2013, 359, and Kühn and colleagues, 2013, 1936: “We 
can, and frequently do, make instrumental actions where we have a definite background feeling or buzz of 
being in control.” 
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sense of ourselves as the agents of various movements – is largely the output of low-level, 
comparator-based systems” (485). Elsewhere in their paper, they elaborate: “A strong case 
can be made for thinking that the contents of agentive experience can go beyond mere 
representation of oneself as the agent of an event, but also include information about degree 
of control one has over the movement and the degree to which the action is effortful “(477). 
These authors endorse the idea that when an agent executes a voluntary movement, 
then she will normally experience a distinctive feeling of agency that should be explained as 
the output of comparator mechanisms involved in online motor control. This feeling of 
agency is thought to be distinctive in two ways: First, it is claimed to have a distinctive type 
of phenomenology, and, second, it is claimed to have a distinctive type of content 
representing one’s movements as self-caused (and maybe the degree of self-causing). For the 
sake of simplicity, I will call the view that voluntary movements are accompanied by a 
distinctive feeling of agency that is the low-level output of comparator-based systems of 
online motor control the Feeling of Agency-Hypothesis (FoA-hypothesis). 
No one should doubt that we have experiences when we perform actions. In an 
ordinary situation, when a person intentionally opens a door, she will consciously intend to 
open it, have proprioceptive and tactile experiences as she moves, grasps, turn, and pull the 
doorknob, have visual experiences of the door and her own body and their relative 
movements; she will furthermore automatically form low-level sensory anticipations of the 
most likely sensory consequences of her movements, as well as higher-level rational 
expectations of action-outcomes. In addition, there might be experiences such as some feeling 
of effort and fatigue and various affective experiences. Some of these experiences or 
constellations of experiences might be distinctive of intentional action, though most likely not 
in the sense of being necessary and sufficient for intentional action. 
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Accepting that the performance of intentional action normally is accompanied by a set 
of cognitive, bodily, and visual experiences is not the same as accepting that there is a special 
feeling of agency produced by low-level comparator mechanisms of motor control. One can 
accept that there are conscious mental states or processes that are proprietary to action, such 
as practical deliberation, practical decision-making and intending, without accepting that 
there is a special phenomenal feeling associated with motor control. And one can do this 
while still accepting that voluntary movements are enabled by low-level, comparator-based 
systems for motor control. For these reasons, it becomes important to evaluate the empirical 
justification for claiming that the normal operation of comparator-based mechanisms of 
control of voluntary movement produces a distinctive feeling of agency. 
The target of this paper is a prominent scientific model of voluntary motor action and 
motor cognition according to which the performance of voluntary movements is associated 
with a low-level, comparator-based, phenomenologically distinctive feeling of agency – in 
addition to the conscious states and experiences listed above.
2
 In section 2, I outline in more 
detail the FoA-hypothesis. Particular emphasis is put on the supposed rational and 
explanatory role played by the distinctive feeling of agency. In section 3, I lay out the 
structure of my argument. The prior probability of the FoA-hypothesis is not higher than the 
prior probability of a simpler hypothesis according to which low-level, comparator-based 
systems for online motor control do not produce any distinctive agentive experience. It 
therefore becomes important to evaluate whether data that are often assumed to support the 
FoA-hypothesis really are more probable given this hypothesis than given the simpler 
hypothesis. Consequently, in Section 4, I look at data from action-recognition paradigms, 
sometimes assumed to be best explained and predicted by the FoA-hypothesis, and, in section 
                                                          
2
 One referee wrote that the argument presented in this paper generalizes to other models of the phenomenal 
sense of agency, such as optimal cue integration (Synofzik, Vosgerau, and Newen, 2008) and some versions of 
Wegner’s inferential model (e.g. Wegner, 2004). Another referee insisted, however, that my arguments only 
have a limited scope and leave other models untouched. I will leave these issues of scope up to the reader. 
Final draft. To appear in Synthese. Please Cite Published Version. 
4 
 
5, I consider a perhaps more direct form of evidence for the FoA-hypothesis, namely, 
evidence from experimental paradigms using introspective reports of degrees of one’s feeling 
of agency. In all cases, a simpler explanation – one that does not include a distinctive feeling 
of agency – is available. If the experimental data do not support the FoA-hypothesis better 
than the simpler hypothesis, we must look elsewhere for a reason to believe that the FoA-
hypothesis is the most probable hypothesis. In section 6, I then consider and reject two non-
experimental, phenomenological arguments in favour of the FoA-hypothesis. Finally, I sum 
up and conclude in section 7. 
 
2. The Feeling of Agency-Hypothesis 
The FoA-hypothesis is the conjunction of four claims: 
1. A person’s ability to make voluntary movements is best explained by a dedicated, 
modular comparator-based control system. 
2. Normally, activation of the comparator-based control system during voluntary 
movement produces as output a distinctive feeling of agency. 
3. The feeling of agency has a distinctive type of phenomenal feel or quality. 
4. The feeling of agency has a distinctive type of representational content. 
Before discussing these claims, let me briefly mention some other features often associated 
with the comparator-based feeling of agency. Without committing myself to any view of non-
conceptual content, a number of properties often associated with non-conceptual content 
follow from the four claims. If the (1) and (2) are correct, then the feeling of agency is the 
output of a modularized control mechanism. This indicates that the feeling of agency is 
belief-independent in the sense that if the comparator-based mechanisms is activated in the 
right way, it will output a feeling of agency independently of the agent’s beliefs about her 
Final draft. To appear in Synthese. Please Cite Published Version. 
5 
 
action and its context (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007). It also seems to follow that the feeling of 
agency is not the product of a personal level inference and is not a judgement.
3
 
Let me outline a number of considerations in favour of the four claims before 
advancing my criticism. Claim 1 is that control of voluntary movements is best explained by 
a dedicated, modular comparator-based control system. The basic idea is well known. For the 
sake of the argument of this paper, we can assume that Claim 1 is true.
4
 Therefore, it will not 
feature prominently in the ensuing discussion. 
Claim 2 states that, normally, activation of the comparator-based control system 
during voluntary movement produces a distinctive feeling of agency. According to one 
proposal about how such a motor control mechanism could produce a feeling of agency, the 
feeling is the output of a comparator successfully matching predicted sensory consequences 
of motor execution (computed by the so-called forward model) with sensory feedback from 
the execution (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007). According to another proposal, the feeling is the 
output of a successful matching between forward model prediction and the intended motor 
goal (Gallagher, 2000). A third proposal is that the feeling is caused by the so-called inverse 
model computing the motor commands needed for successful execution of the motor goal 
(Haggard & Johnson, 2003). Finally, according to a fourth proposal, the low-level feeling of 
agency is jointly caused by signals from action-selection in the inverse model and signals 
from the comparator matching predicted sensations with feedback from the execution 
(Haggard & Chambon, 2012). Many important and decisive questions remain with respect to 
each of these proposals and their relation to each other. For the remainder of this paper, I will, 
however, put these issues of detail to the side. My critical discussion of the FoA-hypothesis is 
aimed at all versions of the comparator-based account of the feeling of agency. By the phrase 
                                                          
3
 See also Haggard and Tsakiris, 2009, 243, and Wenke et al., 2010, 35. 
4
 It should be noted that the “classical” comparator model of motor control is not unchallenged. See, for 
example, Friston, 2011. 
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“comparator-based control system” I refer to the general idea that modular and dedicated 
mechanisms involved in online motor control in addition to their function in motor control 
also produce a distinctive, low-level feeling of agency. 
One possible argument for the comparator-based FoA-hypothesis focus on a 
functional role of the comparator-based identification of a movement as self-produced. The 
need for some such mechanism arises from the fact that an agent’s body is moving all the 
time. Some of these movements will be internally caused by the agent’s intentions, whereas 
countless others are caused by external forces. It is an important task for the motor system to 
keep track of this difference between internally caused and externally caused movements. 
One proposal is that an important mechanism for keeping track of the causal origin of one’s 
movement is a mechanism for comparing sensory feedback from the execution of the 
movement with a prediction of the sensory feedback. To quote Jeannerod: “simulation of the 
outcome of an action by the internal model can be a powerful means for action identification: 
if and only if the reafferent signals match the expectation of the internal model, can the action 
be definitely identified as self-generated” (Jeannerod 2009, 528). If there is a match between 
prediction and feedback, the movement is self-generated and will be tagged with a feeling of 
agency. Without such a tagging mechanism, the agent would not be able to know which of 
her movements are her actions (see Farrer et al., 2008, Hohwy, 2007, Sato and Yasuda 2005). 
So, according to this view, the mechanisms responsible for low-level, comparator-based 
action-identification are also responsible for generating the feeling of agency.
5
 It would seem 
like a small step from this claim to assume that the content of the feeling of agency is 
representing one’s movement as self-generated – a distinctive representational content. 
Consequently, describing the feeling of agency as the output of low-level, comparator-based 
                                                          
5
 Similar functional stories could be told with respect to the other comparator-based accounts of the feeling of 
agency. 
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action-identification also provides us with one way to understand the “distinctiveness” (claim 
4). 
In conceiving of the feeling of agency as a distinctive conscious output of a particular 
kind of low-level, modular comparator mechanism, the feeling of agency is distinguished 
from non-motor, high-level cognitive phenomena like practical decision-making and 
intentions.
6
 There are a number of related reasons for insisting on such a dissociation between 
conscious intention and the feeling of agency. First, one might want to distance one’s model 
from inferential post hoc models of sense of agency, such as Wegner’s (Wegner and 
Wheatley, 1999), by tying the feeling of agency closely to mechanisms of online motor 
control or action-selection (for such reasons, see, e.g., Moore and Haggard, 2008). Second, 
one might want to say that habitual actions, which are not preceded or accompanied by any 
conscious intention, are still associated with a feeling of agency (see, e.g., Bayne and Levy, 
2006). Third, whereas the feeling of agency is the product of low-level, modular comparator 
mechanisms and as such is cognitively impenetrable, intentions have propositional content 
and are the output of inferential activity (see, e.g., Bayne and Pacherie, 2007). Fourth, a final 
reason for distinguishing between, on the one hand, the feeling of agency and, on the other 
hand, reasoning and intentions is the role played by the assumed “intention-free” feeling in 
the explanation of experiences associated with certain neuropsychological and 
psychopathological conditions. I will return to this issue in a Section 6.  
In sum, the feeling of agency is assumed to be a distinctive mental component in 
addition to the mental components already acknowledged by standard theories of action 
(conscious intention, conscious decision, proprioceptive awareness, perception of 
consequences), and not reducible to any of these elements or their combination. On the FoA-
                                                          
6
 By “intention” I mean a personal-level state, which is often the outcome of the agent’s practical decision-
making. It is a state governed by particular normative and rational constraints. As such, this state is very 
different from the kind of functional state sometimes referred to by the term “motor intention”. For discussion 
of this point, see Butterfill & Sinigaglia, 2014. 
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hypothesis, the feeling of agency thus conveys “sparse intention-free information about the 
ways in which the agent is moving” (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007, 488). 
This distinctiveness makes the feeling of agency a strong candidate for a defeasible 
mark of voluntary action.
7
 This means that, most of the time, our voluntary movements are 
associated with a feeling of agency, and if the feeling is missing or is diminished in some 
way, this would be a reason for judging that one’s movement is caused by some external 
agent. Let us call this type of judgement in which a person judges that some event (be it a 
movement or some external environmental event) is caused by herself agency judgements. If 
the feeling of agency is a distinctive conscious mark of voluntary action, then feelings of 
agency would seem to be ideally suited to epistemically ground agency judgements. Many 
researchers thus assume that, in the normal case, an individual’s feeling of agency for some 
event is her epistemic ground for judging that she is the cause of the event. Assuming this 
type of empiricist model, Haggard and Tsakiris (2009, 243) claim: “Under normal 
circumstances, the FoA [feeling of agency] is a necessary condition for JoA [judgement of 
agency], and indeed forms the evidence base for the judgment.”8 
To sum up, according to the FoA-hypothesis, when an agent performs a voluntary 
movement, low-level comparator-based mechanisms of motor control produce a distinctive 
feeling of agency. In virtue of its distinctiveness, the feeling of agency functions as a 
subjective mark of agency and as such serves as evidence base for agency judgements.
9
 
                                                          
7
 See, e.g., Tsakiris and Haggard, 2005, 387. 
8
 See also Bayne and Pacherie (2007): “agentive judgments are typically grounded in and justified by agentive 
experiences. In the normal case, we judge that we are the agent of a particular movement on the grounds that 
we enjoy an agentive experience with respect to it; here, our agentive judgments are simply endorsements of 
our agentive experiences” (477). 
9
 How does my use of the term “feeling of agency” relate to the more frequent use of the term “sense of 
agency” that we see in the literature? It is hard to give a clear answer because of the often ambiguous and 
loose terminology. Often the two terms appear to be simply synonymous but at other times not. According to 
one prominent way to use “sense of agency”, it refers to a more complex phenomenon involving both low-
level phenomenal states and high-level cognitive evaluations and judgements (see Synofzik, Vosgerau, & 
Newen, 2008, and Pacherie, 2008, and Gallagher, 2012, for comparable complex models).  In order to 
distinguish the target of my critique from this type of more global, complex model, I will stick to the term 
“feeling of agency”. On some versions of the complex model, something like the FoA-hypothesis is an element. 




3. A Simpler Hypothesis 
In this paper, I pursue the question of whether experimental data from agency-paradigms in 
cognitive neuroscience support the FoA-hypothesis. I do this in the spirit of contrastive 
hypothesis testing according to which a given hypothesis is tested by asking whether the data 
is more likely on the hypothesis in question than on some other hypothesis (Sober, 1999, 
2008, Machery, 2013). In the present context, the relevant contrasting hypothesis is a simpler 
hypothesis that posits all the same elements as the FoA-hypothesis except for the feeling of 
agency (thus rejecting claims 2-4). This means that the simpler hypothesis explains agency 
judgements not by grounding them in feelings of agency but instead in intentions, perceptual 
expectations, and perceptual experience. I will thus pursue the question of whether data from 
agency-paradigms support the FoA-hypothesis by asking whether data from relevant agency-
paradigms are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis. If 
both hypotheses do an equally good job in predicting the data, then if there are no substantial 
theoretical or common sense intuitions in favour of the FoA-hypothesis, we should prefer the 
simpler hypothesis. That is, we should stop mentioning the feeling of agency in our 
explanations of voluntary action and associated motor cognition. 
Let me say more about the simpler hypothesis and my “hypothesis-testing” strategy. 
A central motivation for the FoA-hypothesis as an empirical hypothesis about the 
mechanisms of motor cognition is its ability to explain the assumed phenomenology of 
voluntary movement as well as an agent’s ability to judge that some environmental event is 
her action or a consequence of her action. In a way, it is an elegant hypothesis as far as it 
explains the ability to judge by explaining the phenomenology. The FoA-hypothesis explains 
agency judgements by the feeling of agency and explains the feeling of agency as the output 
of the comparator-based control mechanisms. But this simplicity is only apparent. The FoA-
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hypothesis is not denying the existence of practical reasoning, intentions, proprioceptive 
experiences, and visual experiences. These additional elements are part of the mental context 
of acting and are important factors in everyday motor cognition.
10
 
The simpler hypothesis explains the agent’s ability to make agency judgements by 
these additional conscious states, the existence of which is acknowledge also by proponents 
of the FoA-hypothesis. When an agent judges whether some event is her own action, she 
draws on various forms of information from her intention, bodily awareness, and vision. The 
simpler hypothesis is simpler because it assumes all the same mental elements as the FoA-
hypothesis except for the distinctive feeling of agency as the output of comparator-based 
motor-control processes. For now, this is all I will say about the simpler hypothesis. To be 
sure, important questions remain. Such as, is there any role left for the comparator 
mechanisms to play in motor cognition according to the simpler hypothesis? And what is the 
role of perceptual expectations? I will briefly return to these questions in Section 7. 
This should suffice to get the argument going. For now, let us assume that prior to or 
independent of experimentally based observations, the simpler hypothesis (according to 
which agency judgements are explained by intentions, perceptual expectations, and 
perceptual feedback) seems just as likely as the FoA-hypothesis (according to which agency 
judgements are explained by the feeling of agency). The question is whether experimental 
data tip the evidential balance in favour of the FoA-hypothesis. It therefore becomes 
important to evaluate whether the FoA-hypothesis is better supported by experimental data 
than the simpler hypothesis. In the following sections, I will therefore ask whether data from 
relevant experimental paradigms are good evidence for the FoA-hypothesis. The general 
thrust of the argument is to compare informally the likelihoods of the two competing 
hypothesis: the probability of the experimental data given the FoA-hypothesis compared to 
                                                          
10
 As has been thoroughly documented by Jeannerod (1997, 2006)  
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the probability of the experimental data given the simpler hypothesis. I will assume that, 
given the equal prior probability of the two competing hypotheses, if the two likelihoods are 
the same, then the data is uninformative with respect to our choice of hypothesis. If the data 
is equally probable given both hypotheses (p(data│FoA-hypothesis) = p(data│simpler 
hypothesis)), then the data itself cannot serve as evidence for one theory over another. If the 
latter turns out to be the case, then, in order to argue for the FoA-hypothesis, one would have 
to look elsewhere than contemporary experimental science.  
It could be objected that the simpler hypothesis is committed to a simplistic epistemic 
bipartition of movements into experience of intentional action and experience of involuntary 
movements, whereas the FoA-hypothesis is motivated by an epistemic tri-partition of 
movements into experience of intentional action, experience of voluntary movements, and 
experience of involuntary movements. That is, the FoA-hypothesis is motivated by the idea 
that some movements are experienced as voluntary even if they are not performed with a 
conscious intention. That is, it is motivated by the idea that sometimes agents can know they 
are acting even if they do not know what their intentions are.
11
 According to the objection, 
the simpler hypothesis cannot explain the experience-based distinctions between, on the one 
hand, intentional action and voluntary movement, and, on the other hand, voluntary and 
involuntary movement. Since agents can report a difference between voluntary and 
involuntary movements in situations where they are not acting intentionally, their reports 
must be grounded on their feelings of agency and not their intentions. My criticism thus 
seems to overlook or misconstrue the real explanatory target of the FoA-hypothesis – a target 
which is out of reach for simpler hypothesis. 
My reply to this objection is threefold. First, it is wrong to think that the simpler view 
is inconsistent with a tri-partition view of action. The simpler view is inconsistent only with 
                                                          
11
 I thank a reviewer for providing me with this sentence. 
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the view that the difference between voluntary and involuntary action implies a difference in 
presence and absence of a feeling of agency. 
Second, I reject the claim that we have any clear examples of reports of voluntary 
agency in cases where the agent is not performing an intentional action. Such cases would 
have to be instances where no intentions are present. Let us briefly look at some of the 
categories of cases often mentioned.  
Habitual action: Buckling the belt when getting into one’s car or the routine involved 
in brushing one’s teeth in the morning might not involve any active reasoning and decision-
making. Be that as it may, it is still very plausible that these actions are controlled by long-
term intentions (policies) and barely conscious practical reasoning and intentions required to 
navigate trivial problems in a dynamic world. I see no reason why we should think that 
actions like reaching for my coffee as I work at my computer do not involve basic forms of 
practical reasoning and context-dependent intentions.  
Sub-intentional action: Mindlessly tapping one’s finger during a lecture or picking 
one’s nose in public are voluntary actions but plausibly not intentional – after all, the agent 
would not have consciously decided to perform these actions in these social contexts. These 
actions are voluntary because, on becoming aware of them, the agent has the power to inhibit 
them. This much I accept. What I deny is that before becoming aware of them, the agent is 
experiencing a feeling of agency. One possible account of these situations would be that on 
becoming aware of these actions, the agent becomes aware of actions that she can either 
endorse (i.e. perform intentionally) or inhibit (intentionally stop performing).  
Autonomic actions:  Blinking and breathing are plausible cases of actions which are 
voluntary but not intended by the agent. They are, however, also cases of which the agent is 
most of the time not conscious and where performance does not require any consciousness. 
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Explaining the difference between an involuntary movement and an autonomic action does 
not require any mention of the feeling of agency. 
To sum up, these are cases that could at most establish a metaphysical tri-partion of 
movements (intentional movement, voluntary movement, and involuntary movement) but not 
a corresponding epistemic tri-partion in experiences of movement requiring us to accept an 
intention-free feeling of agency. 
Third, this paper is primarily concerned with experimental arguments in favour of the 
FoA-hypothesis. There are to my knowledge no experimental paradigms that support the 
view that the difference between voluntary and involuntary movement involves a distinctive, 
intention-free feeling of agency. The simple reason for this fact is the following. 
Experimental action-paradigms require participants to perform tasks as instructed by the 
experimenter. Participants are thus always executing intentional actions. So, even if we can 
make theoretical sense of a metaphysical and epistemic tri-partitions of action, it will in 
principle be extremely difficult to design experiments to investigate it. When discussing the 
experimental designs, we are therefore justified in employing a simple bipartition of action 
into intentional action and involuntary movements. 
 
4. Evidence from Action-Recognition Paradigms 
By assuming an epistemic relation between feelings of agency and agency judgements, the 
proponents of the FoA-hypothesis are provided with a way to interpret data from action-
recognition studies. A typical design is one in which participants are making a manual action 
while watching a monitor showing either their own hand’s moving or someone else’s. The 
task is then to judge whether they are seeing their own bodily movement (Daprati et al. 1997, 
Daprati et al. 2007, Farer et al. 2003, van den Bos and Jeannerod 2002). Other studies have 
extended this paradigm from producing and watching manual action to judgements about 
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who produced (by movements of a joystick or key presses) an arbitrary effect, such as a tone 
or movement of an object on a monitor (Ritterband-Rosenbaum et al. 2011, Sato and Yasuda 
2005, Sato 2009, Wegner and Wheatley 1999). If we assume that participants’ agency 
judgements are grounded in their feelings of agency, then we can interpret their judgments as 
a measure of their feeling of agency.
12
 If we can systematically manipulate participants’ 
agency judgements, then we would most likely be doing it by manipulating their feeling of 
agency, or so the assumption would be. 
This assumption seems to receive additional support from the experimental data 
showing that predictive mechanisms play an important role in making agency judgements. 
The closer the match between predictions (based on action-effect associations learned in a 
training phase of the experiment) and sensory events resulting from a person’s movements, 
the higher the probability that the person judges the event to be under her control (e.g. Sato 
and Yasuda, 2005). Such data are consistent with the idea that forward models compute 
sensory predictions that are subsequently matched with sensory feedback from the movement 
by a comparator mechanism. If we assume that the output of the comparator is a feeling of 
agency, then it seems reasonable to claim that in manipulating predictions and their match 
with feedback, we are also manipulating the feeling of agency. Further evidence for the 
assumption that we can measure the feeling of agency by collecting agency judgements 
comes from data by Tsakiris and colleagues (2005) suggesting that the decisive factor in 
making a correct agency judgement is efferent signals that the authors relate to forward 
models and sense of agency. 
                                                          
12
 See Farrer et al. (2003): “[the feeling of agency] is the feeling that leads us to attribute an action to ourselves 
rather than to another person (324)”. 
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Given these considerations, the question now becomes whether we nevertheless have 
good reasons for thinking that the likelihoods of the FoA-hypothesis and the simpler 
hypothesis are the same.
13
 
As a paradigmatic example of an action-recognition task, let us look at the seminal 
1997-study by Daprati and colleagues. In this study, the task was to perform a requested 
movement and monitor its execution by looking at an image of the movement in a mirror. 
Once the movement was performed, the image would become dark and a question was asked 
to the subject: “You have just seen the image of a moving hand. Was it your own hand? 
Answer YES if you saw your own hand performing the movement you have been executing. 
Answer NO in any other case, that is if you doubt that it was your own hand or your own 
movement.” Daprati et al. tested two sets of movements: extension of a finger or movement 
of a joystick by wrist rotation. For each set of movements, one of three possible images of the 
hand could be presented: participants own hand, experimenter’s hand performing the same 
movement, or experimenter’s hand performing a different movement. The data showed that 
participants made virtually no errors of judgement when watching their own movement or the 
experimenter’s hand performing a different movement. By contrast, errors were made when 
watching the experimenter’s hand performing the same movement. Data showed that 
“[normal participants] misjudged the hand as theirs in about 30% of cases” (Daprati et al., 
1997, 81). Interestingly, data also showed that schizophrenic participants suffering from 
hallucinations and/or delusions of alien control made more frequent errors in this condition 
(Experimenter-Same) in comparison to normal controls (hallucinating 77%, hallucinating + 
delusions 80%, delusions 50%). 
Between conditions, type of voluntary movement and whose hand is being projected 
are being manipulated; but across all conditions, the fact that the agent is performing an 
                                                          
13
 p(data│FoA-hypothesis) = p(data│simpler hypothesis) 
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intentional action remains constant. At no point is there any reason to think that the subject is 
in doubt about whether she is acting or in doubt about what she is doing. She has been asked 
to move her hand and she complies with the instruction. It is important to notice that the 
doubt manifested by participants in the crucial experimental condition (experimenter’s hand, 
same movement) concerns not the participant’s own action but the visual image of a hand’s 
movement in the mirror. The participant is not in doubt about what she is doing with her hand 
underneath the occluded surface but is in doubt about whose action she is seeing on the 
monitor. Thus, in all conditions, the subject knows which movement she is supposed to 
perform and which movement she is in fact performing, she has proprioceptive feedback 
from her moving hand, and she has visual information from the image. This much ought to be 
acceptable to both the FoA-hypothesis and the simpler hypothesis. The FoA-hypothesis is 
distinguished by its postulation of an extra element in order to explain the agency 
judgements. 
This addition is not needed. The simpler hypothesis is that forms of information 
(intention, proprioception, vision), accepted by both hypotheses, provide the subject with all 
she needs in order to make agency judgements in this recognition task. Given these forms of 
information, it is to be expected that the more similar the movement of the experimenter’s 
hand is to the movement performed by the participant, the more mistakes she will make in 
judging whether she is looking at an image of her own hand. When I move my hand in a 
well-rehearsed way, I expect it to feel and look a certain way. If, when I am moving, I am 
looking at an image of a hand’s movement that has a sufficient number of the expected 
kinematic properties, it is only to be expected that I have a tendency to misjudge that the hand 
is my own. This interpretation is supported by data from Daprati et al. (2007) demonstrating 
that visual perception of the kinematic properties of the image can be sufficient to explain 
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action-recognition. Hours after performing a movement, participants can recognise an image 
of their own movement in virtue of its kinematic features. 
To be sure, it might be the case that the best explanation of the subject’s ability to 
match her knowledge of her motor goal, proprioceptive awareness, and visual anticipations to 
the kinematics of the movement represented in the mirror image involves underlying 
comparator-based systems. But this provides us with no independent reason for adding the 
feeling of agency to the picture. For as Jeannerod remarks about the low-level comparator-
based form of identification of movements as self-caused: “in everyday life, action 
identification appears to be a largely automatic process. Subjective awareness does not seem 
to be involved (2009, 528)”. 
It could be objected that this interpretation of the experiment misunderstands the 
motivation for the FoA-hypothesis and the role of the 1997-Daprati experiment in the 
argument for the hypothesis. One important reason for endorsing the FoA-hypothesis is a 
rejection of a standard model of knowledge of action according to which an agent is aware of 
her action by being aware of her intention and her bodily and perceptual experiences while 
acting. One argument for this rejection is the claim that schizophrenic agents suffering from 
delusions of alien control can deny agency for their own actions even though they are aware 
of their intentions and perceptual experiences. Intentions and perception are therefore 
insufficient to explain action awareness and ground knowledge of action. Something is 
missing. I will return to this style of argument in section 6. For now, the important point is 
the claim that it is in the context of the rejection of the standard model of agents’ knowledge 
that we should to understand the 1997-Daprati results: the increased error rate by 
schizophrenic participants must be explained by something else than intentions and 
perception, namely, the diminished or altered feeling of agency. 
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This inference is highly problematic. The rejection of the standard model of 
knowledge of action is not convincing. It might be correct that for a schizophrenic agent 
suffering from delusions of alien control, awareness of her intention and perceptual 
experiences are insufficient for knowing her own action (she is aware of her intentions and 
perceives the consequences of the execution but believes some external agent is controlling 
her movements).
14
 This fact has, however, no immediate implications for the normal case. 
Plausibly, delusions of alien control involve odd or strange experiences when acting.
15
 These 
experiences would act as defeaters. One explanation of the poorer performance of patients 
experiencing alien control in action-recognition tasks could therefore be that they have 
problems in matching their intentions and performance due to certain movement related error 
signals.
16
 In the normal case and in the absence of such defeating “error-signals”, awareness 
of intention and perceptual experiences are all the agent need to know what she is doing. 
To conclude, the data from Daprati et al.’s action-recognition task tell us nothing 
about the normal feeling of agency. The same argument applies to the explanation of 
behaviour in other versions of the action-recognition paradigm. The behavioural data do not 
compel us to add the feeling of agency to the mix. The data therefore provide us with no 
reason for accepting Bayne and Pacherie’s claim that “Agents will typically judge that they 
are the authors of a movement – that it realizes one of their own actions – if and only if they 
have an agentive experience with respect to it” (2007, 486) – where by “agentive experience” 
the authors mean a distinctive feeling of agency produced by low-level, modularized 
comparator mechanisms for motor control. In sum, data from these paradigms do not compel 
us to accept that the FoA-hypothesis offers a better explanation and prediction than the 
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 The experimental evidence for this claim is Spence et al., 1997. 
15
 Frith & Johnstone (2003, 137-138) describe these odd experiences as “unexpected sensations” “that indicate 
that we are not fully in control of our movements” and that “might feel like unpredictable passive 
movements”. 
16
 This seems to be the explanation offered by Frith & Done, 1988, and Stirling, Hellewell, & Quraishi, 1998. 
Notice that Daprati et al. did not find that patients with delusions of alien control were worse at action-
recognition that patients experiencing hallucinations. 
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simpler hypothesis. The data show only that by manipulating sensori-motor predictions, we 
can influence agency judgements. 
 
5. Evidence from Introspective Paradigms 
The fact that the feeling of agency is not needed to explain participants’ agency judgements 
in action-recognition tasks does not show that there is no distinctive feeling of agency. It only 
shows that we do not need to assume such a feeling to explain data from this type of task. The 
feeling of agency might still be needed to explain data from other types of task. Maybe I have 
not considered the right kind. 
The problem could be that agency judgements in recognition tasks are too indirect to 
function as a measure of the feeling of agency. Maybe we need a more direct measure. 
Recently, a number of studies have taken up this challenge. Instead of asking participants to 
make agency judgements (with respect to external events), participants in these studies are 
asked to report their feeling of agency.
17
 If participants in these studies are reporting 
consistently and reliably a distinct feeling of agency, a plausible explanation would be that 
participants experience a distinct feeling of agency. Unless we have independent reasons not 
to trust the participants, we should trust their subjective reports. Let us, therefore, take a 
closer look at some of the studies that allegedly measure the subjective feeling of agency. 
A word of caution is in order before looking at the studies in question. Not all of the 
studies belong to the framework of the FoA-hypothesis. In particular, the study by Wegner 
and colleagues (see below) is sometimes interpreted as going against the FoA-hypothesis in 
so far as it purports to show that the feeling of agency is not the output of low-level 
comparator mechanisms but instead the product of high-level cognitive inferences (Synofzik, 
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 It is an open question whether introspective reports are best understood as a judgement about one’s 
experience or as an expression of one’s experience (see, e.g., Bar-On, 2004). This dispute has no implications 
for the present argument. 
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Vosgerau, and Newen, 2008, but see Carruthers, 2012). One common assumption, accepted 
by all parties to this discussion, is that irrespective of the level at which the causal 
mechanisms responsible for the feeling of agency are located, everyone – experimental 
subjects as well as researchers – is referring to the same distinctive phenomenal experience.18 
It is this feeling that the participants are assumed to report when quizzed about their feeling 
of agency. In what follows, I will question this assumption and thereby undercut the idea that 
such studies can be used in support of the FoA-hypothesis. That is, I will set aside the issue of 
how the reported feeling fits the theoretical framework motivating a given study and simply 
focus on the alleged introspective reports of the feeling of agency. 
Do these studies provide evidence for the claim that the performance of voluntary 
action is associated with a phenomenologically distinctive feeling of agency? If the answer is 
yes, then the FoA-hypothesis is back in business. Data from these introspection studies would 
then be more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis (since 
according to the latter there is no feeling of agency). I will look at two paradigmatic 
experiments, Wegner et al. (2004) and Wenke et al. (2010), both of which has been extended 
and used in other studies (see, for example, Sato, 2009, and Chambon et al., 2013). In both 
cases, my main argument is that there are plausible alternative interpretations of the data that 
make no reference to a feeling of agency. My main thrust of argument is that we have reasons 
for thinking that participants are interpreting the introspective task differently than the 
experimenters. The experimental situations are highly artificial and the “introspective 
questions” are very unusual, so it might not be obvious for participants how to comply with 
the instruction to give a rating of their feeling of control. In the following, I will in turn 
                                                          
18
 As Wegner writes: “Although the proper experiments have not yet been done to test this, it seems likely that 
people could discriminate the feeling of doing from other feelings, knowing by the sheer quality of the 
experience just what has happened” (Wegner, 2004, 658). 
Final draft. To appear in Synthese. Please Cite Published Version. 
21 
 
briefly describe each study and some reasons for accepting an alternative interpretation of the 
data (in line with the simpler hypothesis) before discussing a general methodological concern 
Wegner et al., 2004: In this study, participants were not moving themselves but were 
watching the movements of another person.  Behind each participant was a “hand helper” 
with her arms placed where the participant’s arms would normally be. In front of the 
participant was a mirror in which she could see her own face and torso and the arms of the 
hand helper positioned in such a way as to appear to be the participant's own arms. The 
participants were equipped with headphones and asked to make a number of ratings of their 
experience of vicarious hand movements. Participants were divided in two groups. On each 
trial, the preview group was given verbal instructions (e.g. “wave hello with the right hand”) 
in the headphones just before the hand helper carried out the instruction. The no-preview 
group heard nothing in the headphones (other things being equal). After finishing the exercise 
(26 instructions or 3.5 min) and taking off all of the equipment, participants answered two 
questions (“How much control did you feel that you had over the arms’ movements?”; “To 
what degree did you feel you were consciously willing the arms to move?”) by a rating on a 
7-point scale from 1 = not at all to 7 = very much. The results showed that the preview group 
rated their feeling of control as being higher than the no-preview group (the mean score was 
3.00 compared 2.05). According to Wegner at al., the data demonstrate that the participants in 
the different conditions experience a feeling of agency with varying strength: strongest in the 
preview group, weakest in the no-preview group. If this interpretation is correct, then the data 
seems to be in conflict with the simple hypothesis. If participants are really experiencing a 
feeling of agency and expressing it in their reports, then the data (the introspective reports) 
are more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis according to 
which there is no feeling of agency. 
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Alternative interpretation: In the Wegner et al. study, in the experimental conditions, 
participants are fully aware they aren't performing the action they see – in fact, in nearly all 
conditions, participants are fully aware of the fact that they are not performing any actions 
(Wegner et al., 2004, 846). This fact makes it reasonable to suppose that participants do not 
understand the experimental questions in terms of inner feelings of action-control. Instead, 
when asked how much they felt they controlled the action, it is very likely that participants 
are assessing how much the experimental situations were similar to a situation in which they 
are themselves moving their arm.  Even if there are sensory (perhaps in the shape of motor 
imagery) and affective consequences of watching another person’s arm located where one’s 
own ought to be, there is no prima facie reason for thinking that expressing such an 
assessment of similarity by assigning it a number involves a distinctive feeling of agency. If 
the control scale used in these experiments is thought to range from intentional action with 
preceding conscious decision to completely passive movement, then the preview condition 
should be rated higher than the non-preview condition since it mimics more elements of the 
ideal execution of consciously willed actions. Given the hypothesis that participants answer 
the introspective question by estimating the degree of the analogical similarity between a 
given set of trials and the prototypical intentional action, we would expect a pattern of results 
similar to the one obtained in the Wegner et al. study. 
Wenke et al., 2010: This study investigated the influence of priming facilitating 
action-selection on the feeling of agency. Trials would begin with a fixation cross in the 
middle of a screen, followed by a subliminally presented prime in form of an arrow pointing 
right or left. Shortly thereafter a combined mask and target in the form of another arrow 
would appear. Depending on the direction of an arrow presented on a screen, participants had 
to press a button with the left or the right finger. After a brief interval, a coloured circle 
would appear on the screen. The prime would be either congruent or incongruent with the 
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target and hence with left or right button presses. The colours of the circles would code for 
congruency. Participants were told that the aim of the task was to find out “how much control 
they had over the colour-effect stimuli that followed their key press actions (29).” After each 
block consisting of 72 trials, participants’ feeling of control was measured by “a combined 
ranking and rating procedure”. First, the ranking procedure, participants had to sort all the 
presented colour effects by degree of control over the colour. In this part, every presented 
colour had to be assigned a rank, even if participants felt nothing or were unable to remember 
having seen it. Second, the rating procedure, for each colour, participants rated how much 
control they had on a 0 to 100 scale. The prediction was that a congruent prime should 
facilitate action selection and therefore enhance the feeling of agency or control. The results 
showed that participants tended to give colours from congruent trials a higher control rating 
than colours from incongruent trials. As in the Wegner et al. study, participants in this study 
seem to be able to introspect the strength of their feeling of agency and express it in the 
combined ranking and rating procedure. If that is indeed what the participants are doing, then 




Alternative interpretation: There are a number of plausible alternative interpretations. 
Here I will discuss three different but possibly complementary interpretations, none of which 
makes any reference to a feeling of agency. According to the first interpretation, the data can 
be explained as a non-conscious priming phenomenon. Recall that, in the Wenke et al. study, 
participants were asked to rank colours with respect to the feeling of control and they had to 
do this for all colours, even if they did not remember the colour or any associated feeling. 
This is comparable to a forced choice in a visual task. If we accept that a forced choice can be 
biased by priming in the absence of conscious awareness of the priming stimulus, we should 
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 p(data│FoA-hypothesis) > p(data│simpler hypothesis) 
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accept it as likely, in the Wenke et al. study, that the primes somehow bias the ranking of 
colour items even in the absence of any distinctive feeling of agency. It is likely that in many 
cases the participants were not reporting any feeling but rather guessing by “blindly” ranking 
the colours by sorting them into a particular sequence. On this interpretation, the 
experimental manipulation facilitates action-selection that subsequently non-consciously 
biases the sorting of colour chips. Given the hypothesis that performance in this task can be 
explained by motor-control modules and non-conscious biasing of action-selection, we would 
expect results similar to the results found by Wenke and colleagues. The subsequent explicit 
rating of each colour by the participant is perhaps more difficult to explain in this way. 
The second interpretation is different as it allows that participants are in fact reporting 
some conscious experience, only it is not a feeling of agency. The rating results could be 
explained as a general fluency phenomenon. Priming an action and thereby facilitating 
action-selection produces fluency. Maybe fluency simply feels good, so the more fluent the 
action selection is, the better it feels. If asked to rate colours in terms of positive affective 
qualities, we would predict the same results. Whether it is non-conscious biasing of the 
ranking of colours or biasing of the explicit rating by positive affective quality, the 
conclusion would be the same: there is no reason to assume the existence of a distinct feeling 
of agency to explain the results. 
A third way to explain the reports in the Wenke et al. study would be in terms of how 
confident participants are that they are solving the task correctly. An explanation like this is 
suggested by a study by Metcalfe and Green (2007). Here participants played a game in 
which the task was to touch downward scrolling Xs and avoid touching 0s. Participants’ 
control of the cursor was manipulated by turbulence of the cursor and how close the cursor 
had to come to the target for a hit. Performance was manipulated in other ways as well. After 
each trial, participants made agency judgements and judgements of performance. The authors 
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found that one factor consistently correlated with agency judgements was people’s 
metacognitive assessment of their performance. The authors conclude: “these experiments 
revealed that one factor that contributes to people’s JoA [judgements of agency] is people’s 
assessment of their performance and that this, in turn, is closely but not invariably related to 
their performance itself” (Metcalfe and Greene, 2007, 195). To be sure, in this study, 
participants were not asked to report introspectively on feelings of agency but rather asked to 
make agency judgements. Nevertheless, it gives us reason to suppose that metacognitive 
assessments of performance could be playing a role when people are asked to rate their 
feeling of agency. It is possible that what people report as degrees of feeling of agency is 
their degree of confidence in their assessment of their own behaviour. In the Wenke et al. 
study, ratings and rankings of colours might be an expression of participants’ confidence that 
they controlled the colour effect. Here, participants might really be answering the question 
“how confident are you that you controlled the colour effect?”. When answering such 
questions no inner feeling of control needs to be consulted. Rather, participants have to assess 
their willingness to bet on having made the correct assessment of their performance. This 
third interpretation of the results is too abstract and speculative to afford any concrete 
predictions. It does, however, point the way to new questions and studies. The three 
alternative interpretations can be combined in various ways. For example, it is possible that 
non-conscious priming and conscious fluency feelings are two distinct processes biasing the 
subject’s confidence rating. 
In the two discussed studies, various action relevant dimensions are being 
manipulated (preview vs. no-preview, self vs. no-self, action-selection-facilitation vs. no-
action-selection-facilitation) and the participants’ reports are treated as the dependent 
variable. In both studies, it is assumed that the reports are a direct measure of the feeling of 
agency such that the influence of various manipulations on the feeling of agency can be 
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studied by asking people to report their feeling of agency. I have considered a number of 
reasons for rejecting this assumption. There is at least one more reason for doubting that 
participants in the described experiments are reporting directly on their distinctive feelings of 
agency. This time it is a general methodological worry. 
There is a methodological problem concerning memory. In both studies, reports were 
collected only after each block of trials. The assumption is, according to Wenke et al. (2010, 
32), that participants “monitored sense of control on each trial, and accumulated – possibly 
imperfectly – their experience over the entire block”. On this basis, the authors assume that 
“numerically higher ranks and ratings indicate more perceived control” and that “participants 
felt more in control” (31). Is this assumption justified? 
It is well known that proprioceptive and tactile signals decay very quickly 
(Blakemore, Wolpert and Frith, 1998). Not only are these signals difficult to attend to 
(Fourneret and Jeannerod, 1998), they are difficult to maintain in memory and remember 
even after a short time. According to the FoA-hypothesis, the feeling of agency should be 
comparable in these respects to proprioceptive and tactile sensations. Participants in the 
experiments under discussion are thus not reporting on their current experience but on the 
quickly decaying and fleeting experiences had over many trails, recalled after an interval of 
varying length. The judgements made by participants are at best a recollection, summation, 
and evaluation taking into account many different sources of information. 
Contrast the above two studies with the demand for strict criteria in research on visual 
consciousness. In the visual domain, researchers often discard reports as direct evidence for 
or against visual experience of a stimulus if there is the slightest delay or possibility of 
conscious evaluation.
20
 That is, in the visual domain, researchers are aware that in order to 
                                                          
20
 For example, after an interval, the inability to report a stimulus cannot be taken as proof of absence of 
experience because the subject could simply have forgotten. See, for instance, discussions about overflow of 
conscious experience in the Sperling-paradigm, Sperling, 1960, Block, 2011, Phillips, 2011. 
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gauge visual experience, there is a methodological problem of how to avoid reconstructive 
memory processes intervening between time of stimulus presentation and time of report. In 
the motor domain, this problem is exaggerated by the unfamiliarity of the tasks, 
methodological difficulties in experimentally controlling the object of the reports, and the 
praxis of letting participants report only after a completed block of trials. The fact that the 
participants might not remember the experiences they were having at the time of the 
experimental manipulation only increases the strangeness of the experimental questions and 
thereby the risk of participants adopting alternative interpretations of the “introspective” task 
instructions. 
Neither of the discussed studies makes any effort to alleviate this methodological 
worry or differentiate and control for these various alternative interpretations of the 
behavioural data. If I am right in assuming that the alternative interpretations are just as likely 
as the FoA-interpretation, we have reason to believe that the data from the experiments are 
equally probable given either of our two conflicting hypotheses. To conclude, the data from 
these studies are not more probable given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler 
hypothesis. Without independent reasons, we should prefer the simpler hypothesis. 
 
6. Phenomenology of Agency 
It could be that there are non-experimental reasons for assuming the FoA-hypothesis. Maybe 
it is unnecessary to demand experimental data in support of the claim that voluntary motor 
actions are associated with a distinctive, “sparse intention-free” (Bayne and Pacherie, 2007, 
488) feeling of agency. Maybe it is just a brute phenomenological fact. Demanding that 
science delivers evidence for the FoA-hypothesis would then be like demanding that pain 
researchers produce evidence for the claim that people experience pain. 
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A phenomenological argument to support the FoA-hypothesis would need a way to 
highlight or foreground the relevant phenomenal quality. One way to do this would be to 
contrast an episode with the experience in question with an otherwise similar episode where 
the experience is missing. In the literature, this time predominantly philosophical, we find 
two contrastive, phenomenological strategies for arguing in favour of a distinctive 
phenomenology. 
The first contrastive strategy focus on everyday experiences of active and passive 
movements. One way to bring out or foreground the relevant quality could be to contrast two 
cases that differ only with respect to the quality in question. Contrast, for example, the case 
of intentionally moving your arm from A to B with the case of your arm being pushed or 
pulled from A to B. Imagine that the kinematics of the active and passive movements are the 
same. It seems that in both cases, you have an experience of your arm’s movement from A to 
B, but only in the first case would you have an experience of initiating and controlling 
moving your arm from A to B. It seems that the relevant difference between the two cases is 
the feeling of agency, the specific sense of initiating and controlling the action (for such 
contrastive scenarios, see Bayne, 2011, Gallagher, 2000). 
Everyone can agree that one difference between the two cases is that in the first case 
the agent is moving her arm intentionally from A to B, whereas in the second the agent is not. 
Everyone can equally agree that it is true to say that in both cases the agent’s arm is moving 
from A to B. Given normal constraints on attribution of intentional agency, most people 
should accept that in the first case the agent is aware of moving her arm from A to B 
intentionally. It is, however, a further thing to claim that this difference should be explained 
in terms of a distinctive, intention-free feeling of agency. There is no reason to assume that 
any such thing is being foregrounded in this contrast. Maybe what is being foregrounded is 
the difference between things going as expected and things not going as expected – surprise 
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with a negative valence. In fact, many qualities could change across the two cases. When my 
arm is being pushed, I have a tactile experience of being pushed. And when I am moving 
voluntarily, I know what I am doing and trying to do, and this might involve a variety of 
experiences (of a proprioceptive, visual, haptic, etc., kind). It is a moot question how to spell 
out the agent’s awareness of what she is doing, but it is not generally assumed in the 
philosophical literature that it can be explained in terms of a distinctive intention-free feeling 
of agency tied to comparator-based motor control processes. It is an equally moot question, 
which sensory experiences might be involved, how they are involved, or whether they really 
do remain unaltered across the contrast cases. This contrast between moving voluntarily from 
A to B and being moved from A to B is consequently insufficient to foreground a simple and 
distinctive qualitative difference. 
Maybe I am considering the wrong type of contrast case. To be sure, the argument 
here works by elimination. If successful, it only shows that some contrasts fail in 
foregrounding a feeling of agency. The one I have just considered is, however, the one that is 
being considered in the literature on the subject. The onus is therefore on the proponent of the 




This brings me to the second contrastive strategy. One might think that the problem 
here is that two different categories are being compared: intentional actions and involuntary 
movements. To bring out the qualitative feeling of agency we would need to contrast a case 
of action with the relevant feeling and a case of action where the feeling is for some reason 
significantly altered. Authors contrasting the normal case of intentional action with various 
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 One reviewer suggested that better cases to discuss would be Wegner’s cases of automatisms (Wegner, 
2002, Ch. 1 & 4). These are cases where an apparent voluntary movement is performed without any explicit 
intention or even with explicit disavowal of intention. These are, however, also cases performed without any 
feeling of agency, if any such exist. Since intentions and feeling of agency disappear together in these cases, 
they cannot serve as evidence for an intention-free feeling of agency. Furthermore, most of the descriptions 
are anecdotal. The subjective reports vastly underdetermine our choice of phenomenological description. 
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pathologies of agency, e.g. patients suffering delusions of alien control, have frequently 
exploited this version of the contrast strategy. One version of this strategy would go 
something like this. A patient experiencing alien control might decide to raise her arm, might 
be aware of her intention to be raising her arm, and might be aware of her arm’s rising. 
Nevertheless, she might still deny that she is the one raising her arm and attribute the control 
of the arm’s rising to some external agent. This strange misattribution of control is then 
explained by the patient’s lacking something normal agents have: the feeling of agency (see, 
for example, Bayne and Pacherie, 2007, Bayne, 2011). 
This explanatory strategy is confronted with an immediate problem. From the fact that 
agency is somehow experienced as lost or challenged in these syndromes it does not follow 
that we have a full positive experience of agency in the normal case. The way in which we 
describe these cases can be deceptive. If delusions of alien control and other such 
disturbances are described as an experience of loss of control or diminished control, then you 
might think that in the normal case we would have simply an experience of control (it would 
be a full sense of control, nothing would be lost). This is a consequence of describing the 
negative case as one where something is lost that is there in full figure in the positive case. 
The situation might not be like this.  
What might the situation be like, then? How a specific type of pathological action is 
best described is of course an important and complex issue. In a full coverage of this issue, 
we would need to look systematically at reports made by patients. My conjecture is that the 
various types of pathological cases are not best described as a loss or alteration of a normal 
intention-free feeling of agency. Take the case of schizophrenic patients’ delusions of alien 
control. There are a number of reasons for thinking that a contrast between the normal 
experience of action and disturbed experiences involved in the delusion would yield no clear 
result. The very idea of such a contrast builds on a number of controversial assumptions. 
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Here I will briefly highlight some of the most controversial or problematic assumptions, not 
to demonstrate their falsity, but merely to make it manifest that there is no simple or direct 
way to compare the normal and delusory experiences of action and infer the presence or 
absence of a single phenomenal aspect. 
First, even if we accept a cognitive neuropsychiatric approach (e.g. Frith & Done, 
1988, Coltheart, 2007, Coltheart, Langdon & McKay, 2011), the contrast between normal and 
pathological action need not be informative with respect to phenomenal feelings of agency.
22
 
In order for the contrast to be informative in this respect, it must be assumed that the 
schizophrenic agent’s delusional belief and judgements are grounded on conscious delusional 
experience. It must be assumed that the delusion of alien control involve a low-level 
phenomenal feeling involved in action. This assumption is by no means unanimously 
accepted. In a recent commentary, Wong (2012, 50) expresses doubts concerning this 
epistemological picture. Reflecting on the puzzling judgements made in cases of pathologies 
of agency, he observes: “when we consider the puzzling pattern of deficits that we encounter 
in various pathological conditions, such as schizophrenia, it becomes very unclear that the 
judgement of agency must be read off from the feeling of agency, but cannot be directly 
generated by underlying mechanisms.” And continues: “There is no reason why a delusional 
agency belief or judgement in a schizophrenic cannot be directly generated by predictive 
neural processes without these processes first generating an anomalous agency experience.”23 
Second, even if we concede this point (delusions of alien control are rational 
responses to or endorsements of specific experiences had by the schizophrenic agent), it still 
does not follow that the contrast between the schizophrenic agent’s experience and the 
normal agent’s awareness of action will tell us anything about the normal agent’s feeling of 
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 The neurocognitive approach to psychopathology is of course not universally accepted. For another 
influential but fundamentally conflicting approach, see Bovet and Parnas, 1993, Parnas, 1999, and Parnas et 
al., 2005. 
23
 A similar view is endorsed by Coltheart et al. 2010, 264 (in an explanation of Capgras delusion): “the first 
delusion-relevant event of which the patient is aware is the belief”. 
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agency. It might be the case that the delusional agent’s experience should be explained by a 
deficit of dedicated motor control mechanisms; but it might equally be the case that only in 
the case where this mechanism is malfunctioning does it give rise to a conscious signal. 
When the comparator-based motor control mechanisms are working flawlessly, they do not 
produce any conscious output. In fact, one of their functions might be dampen down or 
cancel out sensations involved in moving one’s body. So, one suggestion might be that when 
these predictive mechanisms or comparators are malfunctioning, then no cancelling out of 
sensations will take place, and self-initiated movements will begin to feel like “unpredictable 
passive movements” (Frith & Johnstone, 2003, 138). The delusional agent might explain 
these experiences by adopting the delusional belief that an alien force is controlling the 
movements.
24
 In order for the contrast between normal experience of agency and delusion of 
alien control to yield any information about the normal feeling of agency, it must be assumed 
that the disturbing experience of agency involved in the delusion is an alteration of a normal 
feeling of agency. The upshot of this discussion is, however, that neither the explanation of 
voluntary action by inverse and forward models and comparator-mechanisms nor the 
cognitive neuropsychiatric approach support this assumption.
25
 
To conclude, neither of the two strategies for contrasting experiences succeeds in 
foregrounding a simple phenomenal quality. There are no simple phenomenological facts 
concerning the feeling of agency to be gained from these contrastive exercises. 
Phenomenological reflection does not render the FoA-hypothesis more probable. 
                                                          
24
 Similar view is expressed by Coltheart, 2005, 155: “Only when a prediction fails does consciousness get 
involved; the unconscious system makes some kind of report to consciousness to instigate some intelligent 
conscious problem-solving behavior that will discover what’s wrong.” 
25
 The argument works by exclusion. Maybe there are contrast cases I have not considered that are genuinely 
informative. Some authors also use the case of Anarchic Hand Syndrome (e.g. Bayne, 2011). This type of case 
can easily be dismissed. Since both intention and (alleged) feeling of agency are missing in AHS, they are not 
informative with respect to an intention-free feeling of agency. See, for example, Cheyne, Carriere, and Smilek, 
2009, 481: “[…] the intentions do not seem to be their concurrent intentions and hence agency is transferred 
from self to hand. Such patients have experienced not merely a loss, but an active alienation, of agency for the 
anarchic actions”. See also, Kritikos, Breen, and Mattingly, 2005, and Della Sala, 2005. 




7. Concluding Remarks 
The FoA-hypothesis is the hypothesis that the performance of voluntary movements is 
associated with a low-level, comparator-based, distinctive and intention-free feeling of 
causing one’s own movements. Distinctiveness and intention-freedom go together: the 
comparator-based feeling of agency is distinctive, which implies that it cannot be reduced to 
an experience of consciously intending to do something. According to the FoA-hypothesis, 
the distinctive and intention-free feeling of agency is a defeasible subjective mark of 
voluntary agency and is therefore apt to serve as the epistemic ground for agency judgements. 
That is, in the normal case, it is rational to judge that you are causing some movement or 
event only if you experience a feeling of agency for that movement or event. 
In this paper, I have treated the FoA-hypothesis as a scientific hypothesis and asked 
what type of evidence we have to support it. In order to answer this question, I have 
contrasted the FoA-hypothesis with a simpler hypothesis that is identical to the FoA-
hypothesis except for the fact that according to the simpler hypothesis the comparator-based 
motor control system does not output a distinctive feeling of agency. I then looked a two 
different types of experimental paradigms often supposed to study the feeling of agency (viz. 
action-recognition and “introspective” paradigms), and asked whether data from these 
paradigms are more likely given the FoA-hypothesis than given the simpler hypothesis. It 
was found that data from these experiments are equally likely according to the FoA-
hypothesis and the simpler hypothesis. Without independent reasons for assuming the 
existence of a low-level, comparator-based, distinctive and intention-free feeling of causing 
one’s own movements, we would have no reason to accept the FoA-hypothesis. 
Could it be that I have misrepresented the FoA-hypothesis? Maybe the feeling of 
agency is not distinctive in the sense of being a phenomenally specific feeling of causing 
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one’s own movement but rather a distinctive kind of pattern in the flow of perceptual 
experiences. The latter view is defended by Prinz (2007). According to Prinz, the forward 
model of the comparator-based control system predicts sensory consequences of the 
movement, and when the brain is processing the reafferent feedback from performing the 
movement, the predicted feedback is cancelled out or attenuated. When sensory feedback is 




Nothing I have said contradicts the claim that comparator-based control systems 
generate a distinctive pattern in the flow of perceptual experience. This being said, it is worth 
noticing that on this account of the comparator mechanisms’ contribution to perceptual 
phenomenology, the experience generated by comparator mechanisms no longer serves two 
functions crucial to the FoA-hypothesis. First, the comparator-based perceptual flow 
experience could not serve as a mark of voluntary agency. Even if the comparator 
mechanisms of motor control explains this pattern of flow of anticipations and feedback only 
with respect to the movements, we find the same structure of ongoing flow of anticipation 
and sensory feedback in other domains as well, such as speech processing and perceptual 
learning. We have the structure of anticipation and sensory feedback when observing other 
people’s actions, listening to music, and going for the nth ride in a roller coaster. Second, as a 
consequence, there would no longer be any rationale for claiming that the feeling of agency 
serves as the epistemic ground for agency judgements. The feeling of agency would not 
provide me with a reason for thinking that I am the cause of some event. This should suffice 
to show that proponents of FoA-hypothesis do not have this “perceptual flow” interpretation 
in mind. 
                                                          
26
 See Pacherie, 2001, 174: ‘‘our ordinary experience of agency may simply be a rather diffuse sense of a 
coherent ongoing flow of anticipations and sensory feedback.” Also Hohwy and Frith, 2004, 185. 
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This conclusion does not exclude perceptual anticipations and flow from playing 
distinctive roles in the agents’ knowledge of their own actions and their agency judgements 
according to the simple hypothesis. Here, one suggestion could be that when sensory 
anticipations and experiences are related in the right way to the agent’s intention, sensory 
evidence could be having an important epistemic role in explaining and justifying agency 
judgements.
27
 Whether the comparator model of motor control in the end turns out to be the 
best explanation of motor related sensory anticipations and flow-experiences is not crucial to 
this epistemic account of agents’ knowledge and agency judgements. 
If we reject the FoA-hypothesis, what is then the alternative? According to a dominant 
view, there are two possible and competing models of agentive experience. The first model is 
the FoA-hypothesis. The second model is an inferential model according to which agentive 
experience depends on holistic, domain-general mechanisms involved in “narrative” self-
understanding (Stephen and Grahams, 2000, Wegner, 2002). According to the most 
prominent version of this model, the experience of agency is the product of a post hoc, 
reconstructive inference from prior thoughts and post-action sensory events. As Haggard and 
Tsakiris put it: “According to [the inference model], the sense of voluntary control is 
effectively a reconstructive illusion that one’s intention has caused an external event, 
analogous to Hume’s view of causation as an illusory inference from the constant conjunction 
of cause and effect” (2009, 243). By arguing against the FoA-hypothesis am I then arguing 
for the inferential reconstructive model? 
The answer is no. The choice between the FoA-hypothesis and the inferential-
reconstructive model is not exclusive. There are other options. Recall that the simple 
hypothesis is exactly like the FoA-hypothesis except for the feeling-component. The simpler 
hypothesis thus involves conscious intentions, conscious anticipations, awareness of what one 
                                                          
27
 See Grünbaum, 2011, for an argument in support of the idea that perception often has a distinctive, 
epistemic function in agents’ knowledge of their own actions. 
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is trying to do, and various bodily and perceptual experiences. We are not forced to claim that 
the agent’s awareness and agentive experiences are inferred only after performing the action. 
The agent’s experience could be part of her conscious intention to be doing the action or 
could be a consequence of having such an intention, and as such this experience might 
predate or be concurrent with the performance. According to a prominent philosophical 
model of agents’ knowledge of their own action, an agent is normally successful in her skill-
based actions. When she intends to perform a skill-based action, she is normally in a position 
to know what she will be doing or is doing (depending on type of intention, for discussion, 
see Falvey, 2000, Grünbaum, 2011). Such an account is in line with some researchers’ 
emphasis on premotor determinants of the agentive experience. According to this emphasis, 
the agentive experience is to a large extent dependent on premotor components of action, 
such intention, planning, and action-selection (Vinding et al., 2013, Jensen et al., 2013, 
Chambon and Haggard, 2013). Denying that there is a distinctive, intention-free feeling of 
agency generated by low-level comparator-based control processes is therefore neither to 
deny that there are distinctive mental states involved in acting intentionally, nor to deny that 
comparator-based control mechanisms are important to control of voluntary movements. 
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